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MUNICIPAL INSOLVENCY:
THE NEW CHAPTER IX OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
LAWRENCE P. KING*
On April 8, 1976, the most recent amendment to Chapter IX of
the Bankruptcy Act was enacted into law and became effective.1 It
replaced sections 81-84 of the Act which Congress had enacted in
1937.2 Subsequently, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted
a revised set of Chapter IX Rules and Official Forms and forwarded
them to the Congress.3 The rules and forms became effective on
Murry and Ida Becker Professor of Law and Associate Dean, New York Univer-
sity School of Law.
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as Act, or cited by relevant chapter number];
Act to Amend Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315,
amending 11 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as Chapter IX Amendment,
or cited by relevant section number];
CHAPTER IX RULES AND OFFICIAL CHAPTER IX FORMS, reported in Supreme Court
Reporter, vol. 96, no. 15, at 43 (June 1, 1976) [hereinafter cited as RULES, or cited by
relevant Rule number];
CONFERENCE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 10,624, H.R. REP. No. 94-938, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as CONF. REP.];
REPORT ON H.R. 10,624, H.R. REP. No. 94-686, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [here-
inafter cited as H.R. REP.];
REPORT ON S. 2597, S. REP. No. 94-458, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter
cited as S. REP.].
1. Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315 (April 8, 1976).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (1970).
3. RULES. Prior to the amendment, the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules
of the Judicial Conference of the United States had prepared rules of procedure for
Chapter IX. The draft rules had been submitted to the bench and bar for comment,
were finally approved by the Advisory Committee, and had been submitted to the Stand-
ing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure for its approval. The Standing Com-
mittee had forwarded the rules to the Judicial Conference of the United States which
in turn, after approving them, forwarded them to the Supreme Court of the United States
for promulgation. Accordingly, during the period when Congress was considering an
amendment to Chapter IX, the rules which had been drafted pursuant to Chapter IX
as it had existed since 1937 were sitting with the Supreme Court but had not yet been
promulgated. When it appeared likely that Congress would pass the amendment to
Chapter IX, the Advisory Committee revised the rules in light of the amendment and,
following the same process of obtaining approval from the Standing Committee and the
Judicial Conference, the revised set was submitted to the Supreme Court as a substitute
for the prior set. The revision of the rules was obviously necessary in light of the
change in the statute. For the most part, the revised set of rules follows very closely
the procedural portions of the amended Chapter. Where there is conflict between the
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August 1, 1976. Thus, the source of substantive law and procedural
rules governing a municipal insolvency is now found in Chapter IX of
the Bankrupcy Act and in the Chapter IX Rules.
The amendment to Chapter IX was necessitated by a recognition
that the version in existence did not serve the purposes for which it
was intended. The fiscal crises in New York and other cities arising
during the summer and fall of 1975 showed clearly that Chapter IX,
as it existed in the Bankruptcy Act, was not realistically available to
major public entities. A singular difficulty with respect to sections 81-
84 was the requirement that, in order to commence a proceeding under
Chapter IX, the petitioner had to file at the outset a plan which had
been agreed to by a majority (in dollar amount) of creditors affected
by the plan.4 This meant that before a petition could be filed the
municipality had to draft a plan, negotiate that plan with creditors, and
obtain consents. All of this is a time-consuming process which makes
it virtually impossible to obtain speedy relief. Additionally, it was
recognized that many of the creditors who would be affected by the
plan were holders of bonds in bearer form. Thus, it was impossible
to determine the identity of such creditors and obviously, therefore,
impossible to negotiate and obtain the necessary consents. In
response to these concerns the 1976 amendment contains many im-
provements designed to simplify and expedite Chapter IX proceedings
and to remove these practical impediments to their use.
The Requirements for Relief
Section 84 sets forth the requirements for seeking relief under
Chapter IX. Certain facts must be alleged in a petition filed under
Chapter IX;6 these facts must also be proven at a hearing if the petition
is contested. 7 First, the political subdivision, public agency or instru-
mentality must allege that it is generally authorized by state law to file
a petition under Chapter IX. This provision stems from two Supreme
Court decisions of the 1930s, one of which declared a predecessor
statute unconstitutional8 and the second of which upheld a revision of
rules and the amended Chapter, the rules control; pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970),
the rules have the effect of superseding those procedural provisions.
4. See II U.S.C. § 403 (1970), as amended, Act § 83.
5. See CONF. REP. 17.
6. See Official Chapter IX Form No. 9-Fl, reprinted in Supreme Court Reporter,
vol. 96, no. 15 at 69-70 (June 1, 1976), (entitled "Chapter IX Petition" and incorpo-
rating the requisite allegations and statements).
7. See notes 25-27 infra and accompanying text.
8. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513
(1936). The district had filed an insolvency petition under the Act of May 24, 1934,
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that statute.9 One of the factors upon which the Court relied in finding
the revised law constitutional was the provision in that statute which
left to the states the power to determine whether their agencies and sub-
divisions could make use of the federal bankruptcy statute. 10 Until
enactment of the 1976 amendment, Chapter IX did not contain the
requirement that a governmental entity be authorized under state law
to file a petition. The omission of such a requirement from the
chapter, viewed in light of these Supreme Court decisions, led to
the conclusion that a petition could be filed unless the petitioner was
expressly prohibited from utilizing Chapter IX. In other words, prior
to 1976, affirmative authorization was not required, but the states could
enact legislation which would prohibit their subdivisions or agencies
from utilizing the Bankruptcy Act."
In the drafting of the 1976 amendment, this approach to the au-
thorization question was recognized as one of the possibilities. At the
other extreme, some thought was given to requiring specific state au-
thorization for the filing of such a petition.' 2 This would mean that
in advance of filing a petition there would have to be a state enactment
which would authorize that particular subdivision, agency or in-
ch. 345, §§ 78-80, 48 Stat. 798, captioned "Provisions for the Emergency Temporary
Aid of Insolvent Public Debtors .... ." The statute was invalidated on the grounds that
it exceeded Congress' authority to interfere in local fiscal management, and, more spe-
cifically, that it operated as an indirect impairment of the states' rights to enter into
contracts. 298 U.S. at 530-32.
9. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938). Petitioner in this case was a local
irrigation district. The petition was filed under Chapter X of the 1937 Amendments
to the Bankruptcy Act, Act of August 16, 1937, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653. Ashton was dis-
tinguished on the basis that the new Chapter X was
carefully drawn so as not to impinge upon the sovereignty of the State. The
State retains control of its fiscal affairs. The bankruptcy power is exercised in
relation to a matter normally within its province and only in a case where the
action of the taxing agency in carrying out a plan of composition approved by
the bankruptcy court is authorized by state law. It is of the essence of sover-
eignty to be able to make contracts and give consents bearing upon the exer-
tion of governmental power. 304 U.S. at 51-52.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 508-09
(1942); Mission Independent School Dist. v. Texas, 116 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 313 U.S. 562 (1941).
12. The House bill provided only that an entity must not be prohibited by state law
from filing a Chapter IX petition. H.R. 10,624, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 84 (1976).
"The reference to a prohibition by state law recognizes a limitation frequently expressed
in the cases and literature." H.R. REP. 20, citing Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury
Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942); see 5 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 81.04 (14th ed. rev.
1976); Note, A Survey of Municipal Bankruptcy Law and Procedure, 38 BROOKLYN L.
Rnv. 478, 485-87 (1971). The Senate bill required specific authorization. S. 2597, 94th




strumentality to commence a proceeding under Chapter IX. The final
version of section 84 reaches what might be termed a compromise
solution or middle ground. It provides that there must be general
authorization to file a petition under Chapter IX.' 3 The general au-
thorization can be accomplished by state legislation at any time; it need
not be enacted specifically in response to a particular situation.
Even with the less stringent requirement of general authorization,
problems may occur. For example, a financial crisis may arise which
had not been contemplated previously. At the time when a state
agency must or should make use of Chapter IX such general authori-
zation may be lacking, and the legislature may not even be in session.
Accordingly, there may be time wasted in attempting to get the legis-
lation; at worst, it may simply be impossible for that particular agency
to get the requisite authorization to use Chapter IX. It would have
been better had the prior law of "prohibition" been retained in the
amended version of Chapter IX. The states would have retained the
power to determine whether they should permit their subdivisions,
agencies and instrumentalities to utilize the Bankruptcy Act, but
without the attendant dilemma of requiring an affirmative act of the
legislature which at times may be difficult, either politically or practi-
cally, to accomplish.
The second required allegation is that the petitioner is eligible for
relief under the chapter, i.e., that it is a proper political subdivision,
a public agency or instrumentality. These terms are not defined
in the statute. 14
Third, the petition must allege that the petitioner is insolvent or
unable to meet its debts as they mature. Insolvency is defined in
section 1 of the Bankruptcy Act, but that section does not necessarily
apply in Chapter IX cases. 15 However, it is reasonable to assume that
The Committee considered it questionable whether the affirmative 'consent of
the state is constitutionally required. If not for constitutional reasons, the
Committee believed as a policy matter that such consent should be obtained.
A general statutory provision which may have been enacted prior to this Chap-
ter is thought by the Committee to meet the requirement of specific consent.
In the absence of general statutory consent, [section] 803 (a) authorizes the chief
executive, legislature or any other governmental officer or organizations so
empowered under state law, to authorize the filing of such a petition.
S. REP. 16. It would seem that this expression of intent would permit a general as dis-
tinguished from a specific authorization.
13. See generally CoNF. RP. 16-17.
14. Section 81(8) defines "petitioner" to mean an "agency, instrumentality, or sub-
division which has filed a petition under this chapter." Section 84 refers to any "State's
political subdivision or public agency or instrumentality" as being eligible for relief.
15. Chapters X, XI and XIII each contain a general provision incorporating the sec-
tions in Chapters I-VII of the Act. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 702, 1002 (1970). No com-
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the definition of insolvency contained in section 1 (the balance sheet
test) 1 would be applicable, as well as the equity definition of insolven-
cy which is expressly incorporated into section 84 by the provision
regarding inability to meet debts as they mature.
Fourth, the petition must allege a desire to effect a plan to adjust
the petitioner's debts. This would of course present no difficulty by
way of allegation or proof.
Finally, the petitioner must allege at least one of the four alter-
natives set forth in clauses (1) through (4) of section 84. These
alternatives are:
(1) that petitioner successfully negotiated a plan with creditors
holding at least a majority in amount of claims; or
(2) that petitioner negotiated in good faith but was unable to
obtain the agreement of at least a majority of such creditors; or
(3) that such negotiation is impracticable; or
(4) that petitioner has a reasonable fear that a creditor may at-
tempt to obtain a preference.
These clauses also represent a compromise between two positions.
In drafting the amendment, one thought was to eliminate any
restriction with respect to the filing of a petition under Chapter IX,
recognizing that under the prior version it was extremely difficult to
make use of the chapter because the petition had to be accompanied
by the plan and the necessary consents.'" Another choice would have
been to retain stringent requirements in order to "limit accessibility to
the bankruptcy court somewhat.' 8  The requirement for a pre-petition
plan and agreement of creditors is retained in clause 1 of section 84;
if that is impossible to obtain, a good faith attempt to negotiate a plan
is recognized as an acceptable substitute. If even that is impossible
to accomplish, the statute allows petitioner to allege that negotiation was
impracticable under the particular circumstances. A finding of im-
parable provision was included in amended Chapter IX. Accordingly, only those provi-
sions expressly incorporated are applicable in a Chapter IX case. Section 1, the defini-
tions section of the Act, is not so incorporated.
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1970):
A person shall be deemed insolvent within the provisions of this Act when-
ever the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property which he may have
conveyed, transferred, concealed, removed, or permitted to be concealed or re-
moved with intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors, shall not at a fair
valuation be sufficient in amount to pay his debts.
17. See H.R. REP. 6-7.
18. CONF. REP. 17. It is interesting to note that neither H.R. 10,624 nor S. 2597
as reported out by the respective Committees on the Judiciary contained the require-
ments that found their way into clauses (1) through (4) of section 84. The Conference
Report does not indicate at whose instigation they were added during conference.
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practicability could presumably be based on insufficient time or the
inability to identify the major part of the creditors who would be af-
fected by such a plan. The final alternative allegation, which will per-
haps be used as a catchall, is that petitioner has a reasonable fear that
a creditor may attempt to obtain a preference. Preference is defined
by section 60a of the Act to mean a transfer of a debtor's property to
a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made within four
months of the filing of a petition under the Act and at a time when
the debtor was insolvent, which transfer has the effect of giving to
that creditor a greater percentage of its debt than other creditors of the
same class would receive."9 Under section 84(4), petitioner need only
allege that it has a "reasonable fear" that some creditor "may" attempt
to obtain a preference. This could presumably mean that a creditor
is threatening a lawsuit to obtain judgment for the purpose of collecting
a debt, or that particular pressure is being placed upon petitioner by
a creditor in order to obtain preferential payment of an antecedent
debt.
In summary, it should be possible for a political subdivision,
public agency or instrumentality of a state to make use of Chap-
ter IX by alleging either that negotiation of a plan is impracticable
or that there is in existence some creditor who is threatening to obtain
a preference.
Procedure Under Chapter IX
Rule 9-11, read in conjunction with section 85(a), specifies the
procedural steps to be taken at the very beginning of a Chapter
IX case. When a petition is filed, the court is directed, under Rule
9-11(a), to enter an order approving the petition if it is satisfied that
the petition complies with the requirements of Chapter IX and has
been filed in good faith. That order may be entered ex parte or the
court may hold a hearing. Such an order is considered only a prelimi-
nary approval of the petition, because it does not foreclose the possi-
bility that a party in interest may file an answer to the petition and
that the court may subsequently find the petition to have been impro-
perly filed. 20  Even in determining whether preliminary approval
should be given, the court is not bound to issue an immediate adjudi-
cation; if it is not satisfied that the petition complies with Chapter IX
19. Since section 84(4) refers merely to "preference," only the provisions of section
60a of the Act are incorporated. Section 60b is excluded. That subsection makes a
preference (as defined in section 60a) voidable if the creditor receiving it had reason
to know of the debtor's insolvency.
20. See notes 25-27 infra and accompanying text.
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or that it has been filed in good faith, the court may permit the petition
to be amended. Finally, of course, the court may dismiss the case.
After preliminary approval is given, the court is to set a date for
a meeting of creditors, which is to be held not less than 30 nor more
than 90 days after such approval.2 1 Pursuant to section 85(d) and
Rule 9-14(a), at least 30 days' notice must be given by mail to cred-
itors whose names and addresses appear on a list filed with the
court.2 2  This notice must also be published "at least once a week
for 3 successive weeks in at least one newspaper of general circulation
published within the district in which the case is pending, and in such
other paper . . . [of] general circulation among bond dealers and
bondholders as may be designated by the court.123  Publication of the
notice must begin as soon as practicable after the filing of the petition
and must be completed at least 30 days before the date fixed for the
meeting.24
Chapter IX can be used on a voluntary basis only. While a volun-
tary petition may be filed by an eligible governmental entity, the
chapter contains no provision by which a creditor may force a govern-
ment body into involuntary bankruptcy. Pursuant to section 85(a) and
Rules 9-10 and 9-11, however, creditors and other parties in interest
may object to a petition. Any party in interest may serve and file an
answer to a petition within 15 days of the completion of publication
of notice. The answer must contain all defenses and objections,
including any which may be raised by separate motion under Rule
12(b),(e), or (f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 20  If such
an answer is filed in timely fashion, Rule 9-11(h) requires that the
court hold a hearing on the answer and petition either at the meeting
of creditors or at such earlier time as it may fix. The court may dis-
miss the petition after hearing if it finds that the petitioner did not file
the petition in good faith or if the petition does not meet the require-
ments of Chapter IX.27  The case may also be disposed of by the is-
suance of "such other order as may be appropriate. 28  Permission to
amend the petition may constitute an appropriate alternative order
under some circumstances. 29
21. Rule 9-17.
22. Rule 9-7 requires the petitioner to file a list of creditors of each class containing
their names and addresses, the amount of their claims and the character of their claims.
23. Rule 9-14(h)(1).
24. Id. These provisions of the Rule are derived from section 85(d).




29. See Rule 9-11(a).
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It is apparent that between the filing of the petition and entry of
an order after hearing (if the petition is contested), some activity may
have occurred in the case. It is further apparent that there may be
an appeal from the order issued. Accordingly, section 85(a) provides
that "[t]he reversal on appeal of a finding of jurisdiction shall not
affect the validity of any certificate of indebtedness authorized by the
court and issued in such case." This provision protects third parties
who may have dealt with the petitioner by purchasing or lending
against a certificate of indebtedness and also, of course, makes it
possible for the petitioner to obtain emergency financing, when appro-
priate, at the very beginning of the case."0
Confusion may arise concerning the court before which Chapter
IX cases will proceed. Unlike other proceedings under the Bankruptcy
Act, the bankruptcy court has no role whatsoever to play in a Chapter
IX case, and the function of the bankruptcy judge is extremely
limited." There is no provision in Chapter IX for the appointment
or election of a trustee or receiver to displace, or act with, the existing
officials of the petitioner.32 When the Chapter IX petition is filed,
section 82(d) provides that the Chief Judge of the district court is to
30. For a discussion of certificates of indebtedness, see notes 51-55 infra and accom-
panying text.
31. Section 81(2) defines "court" to mean the "court of bankruptcy in which the
case is pending, or a judge of such court." Section 82(d) refers to the "judge of the
district court" who is to conduct the proceeding. Rules 9-38(6) and 9-38(8) define
"court" and "judge" to mean "the United States district court or a judge thereof."
The House Report states that the definition in section 1(10) of the Act, which
makes the United States district court the court of bankruptcy, was copied into section
81(2); this was meant to render it clear that the Chapter IX case "is to be conducted
in the district court, before a district judge, rather than before a referee in bankruptcy."
H.R. REP. 15.
The new Rules follow section 87(a) and provide as follows with respect to reference
to the bankruptcy court:
The court may refer any special issue of fact to a referee in bankruptcy for
consideration, the taking of testimony, and a report on such special issue of
fact, if the court finds that the condition of its docket is such that it cannot
take such testimony without unduly delaying the dispatch of other business
pending in the court, and if it appears that such special issue is necessary to the
determination of the case. A reference to a referee in bankruptcy shall be the
exception and not the rule. The court shall not make a general reference of
the case, but may only request findings of specific facts. Rule 9-13.
Interestingly, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States proposed
that Chapter IX cases be conducted in the bankruptcy court before a bankruptcy judge.
See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BA~xiUaPcY .Aws OF THE UNITED STATES,
PART II, c. VIII (1973).
32. Two minor exceptions do exist. Under section 85(h), if petitioner refuses to
seek recovery of a pre-bankruptcy transfer rendered voidable by that section, the court
on application of a creditor may appoint a trustee for that limited purpose. Addition-
ally, the court may appoint a disbursing agent for the purpose of making distribution
under a plan. See section 95(b)(1)(B); Rule 9-27(c)(1).
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notify the Chief Judge of the court of appeals of that circuit of the fact
of the filing. The Chief Judge of the circuit then specially designates
a district court judge to conduct the proceedings. Thus, the judge
selected to conduct the proceedings is not picked at random as in an
ordinary civil case, but rather by the Chief Judge of the circuit who
has the opportunity to review the calendars of the particular judges and
to make a selection based on whatever criteria he deems important.
Section 85(c), the venue provision, requires that a petition be filed
in the district in which the petitioner is located. A filing fee
of $100.00 must accompany the petition.
The Effect of Filing a Petition
(1) Stays. Pursuant to section 85 (e) and Rule 9-4, the filing of
a petition under Chapter IX operates as an automatic stay of various
acts and proceedings.13 This automatic stay provision in both the stat-
ute and the rule is comparable to the automatic stay rules in Chapters
X, XI and XII of the Bankruptcy Act. 4 The Chapter IX automatic
stay, however, is somewhat broader in that it applies as well to any
attempt to effect a set-off by a creditor of the petitioner.
As do the rules governing other chapters of the Act, Rule 9-4 and
section 85(e) provide for relief from the stay for any parties affected.3
When a complaint requesting such relief is filed, the court is directed
to set a hearing at the earliest possible date to resolve the issue of
whether the stay should continue or be modified, terminated or condi-
tioned. Absent any modification of the stay it will continue until the
case is closed or dismissed or, if it affects property subject to a lien,
until that property is abandoned or transferred with the approval of the
court.36
The effect of the automatic stay provision is to make it unneces-
sary for the petitioner to initiate a proceeding in the district court to
stay any of the acts or proceedings encompassed by section 85(e) and
33. Rule 9-4(a) provides:
A petition filed under Rule 9-3 shall operate as a stay of the commencement
or the continuation of any court or other proceeding against the petitioner or
any officer or inhabitant thereof, which seeks to enforce any claim against the
petitioner, or of any act or the commencement or continuation of any court or
other proceeding to enforce a lien on the property of the petitioner or a lien
on or arising out of taxes or assessments due the petitioner, and shall operate
as a stay of the enforcement of any setoff or counterclaim relating to a con-
tract, debt, or obligation of the petitioner.
34. See Chapter X Rule 10-601; Chapter XI Rule 11-44; Chapter XII Rule 12-43.
35. Section 85(e)(3); Rule 9-4(c).
36. Section 85(e)(2); Rule 9-4(b).
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Rule 9-4. Provision is made, however, for obtaining other injunctive
relief when necessary, with notice and hearing and for cause shown.3 7
Related to the automatic stay are two provisions in Chapter IX
of the Act which have no counterpart in any other chapters in the
Bankruptcy Act. Section 85(f) provides that an ipso facto clause in
a contract or lease is unenforceable. That is, a provision in a contract
or lease which permits a party to terminate that contract or lease in
the event of the insolvency of the petitioner or the commencement of
a proceeding under Chapter IX is not enforceable, subject to the con-
dition that any prior defaults are cured and adequate assurance of future
performance is provided. Thus the petitioner would have the oppor-
tunity to reinstate a defaulted contract or lease.
Section 85(g) provides for the recovery of a pre-petition set-off
asserted by a creditor of the petitioner. This section supplants section
68 of the Bankruptcy Act for practical purposes by providing that any
set-off which was effected within four months prior to the filing of the
petition is voidable and recoverable by the petitioner after hearing on
notice. A bank which has been holding funds of the petitioner may
accordingly be required to return any set-off which it has made against
a debt owing to it within four months prior to the petition. Section
85(g) does afford some protection for the creditor who may have to
reverse a set-off by providing that "[t]he court may require as a con-
dition to recovery that the petitioner furnish adequate protection for
the realization by the person against whom or which recovery is sought
of the claim which arises by reason of the recovery." That protection
may be accomplished in suitable instances by providing for some pri-
ority in the plan itself at the later stages of the Chapter IX case. 9
(2) Avoiding powers. Section 85(h) is new to Chapter IX al-
37. See section 85(e)(4); Rule 9-4(d).
38. Conversely, section 68 recognizes the right to set off mutual debts and credits
in ordinary bankruptcy cases. Set-off under section 68 was disallowed in a railroad reor-
ganization case, Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467 (1974). See H.R. REP.
2-3, 23.
39. The House Report indicates that if the effect of recovery is to permit petitioner
to use collateral, protection should be afforded, but if collateral is not involved protec-
tion "might be neither required nor appropriate. The decision in each case is left to
the sound discretion of the court." H.R. REP. 3. Why the report should make such
a distinction is not entirely clear. If set-off had been rightfully effected prior to the
filing of the petition, any recovery ordered would be of property of the creditor; thus,
in either situation a property right or interest may well be affected. The report cites
In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966), which did not require protec-
tion for a secured creditor in a Chapter X case, and In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367
(2d Cir. 1971), on remand, No. 71-B-291 (S.D.N.Y., July 15, 1971), which required
payments to secured creditors representing economic depreciation of their collateral.
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though it is not new to other types of cases under the Bankruptcy
Act. For the first time, many of the avoiding powers which permit
a petitioner to set aside pre-petition transfers are incorporated within
Chapter IX. Under this section, the provisions of sections 60a, 60c,
67a, 67d, 70c, 70e(1), and 70e(2), as well as the first three sentences
of section 60b, apply in Chapter IX cases, and for this purpose the label
"petitioner" is deemed to be the equivalent of "bankrupt," "debtor,"
or "trustee."
Section 60a and the first three sentences of section 60b define a
voidable preference and make a transfer coming within the definition
of that term voidable at the instance of a trustee.40 Thus, the
petitioner in a Chapter IX case may, if it can prove all of the elements
of a voidable preference as set forth in those sections, set aside a pre-
petition transfer.
Section 67a renders voidable a judicial lien obtained within four
months of the filing of a petition under the Act at a time when the
debtor was insolvent. Accordingly, a judicial lien obtained under
similar circumstances against a Chapter IX petitioner is also voidable
at its instance. 4
1
Sections 67d and 70e as incorporated in Chapter IX permit the
setting aside of fraudulent conveyances and transfers. Section 67d is
the Bankruptcy Act's version of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act. It makes a fraudulent conveyance as defined in that section
voidable if it occurred within one year prior to the filing of the petition.
Section 70e does not define a fraudulent conveyance but rather
incorporates the applicable state law regarding fraudulent conveyances
and other types of conveyances voidable by creditors. It permits the
petitioner to succeed to the rights of any creditor with a provable claim
40. A voidable preference is a transfer of a bankrupt's property to a creditor for
or on account of an antecedent debt which occurs within four months prior to the filing
of a petition in bankruptcy and at a time when the bankrupt was insolvent. It is also
required that the creditor had reason to know of the debtor's insolvency and that the
effect of the transfer was to give that creditor a greater percentage of his debt than other
creditors in the same class would receive. Sections 60a, 60b. It should be noted that
because it incorporates the section 60b requirement that the creditor have reason to
know of the bankrupt's insolvency, the definition of "preference" under section 85(h)
differs from the one found in section 84(4) (setting forth standards of eligibility for
filing under Chapter IX). See note 19 supra.
"Transfer" is broadly defined in section 1(30) of the Act to include involuntary
transfers, and creation of liens and security interests. That definition would presumably
be applicable for purposes of a Chapter IX case.
41. This section is unlikely to be used when petitioner is a municipality. Judicial
liens against public property will rarely if ever be obtained, whether through the attach-
ment or judgment process.
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relative to a pre-bankruptcy transfer. If a creditor with a provable
claim 42 has the right, under state law, to set aside a pre-bankruptcy
transfer, that right passes to the petitioner.
Section 70c is the "strong-arm" provision. It gives to a trustee
in bankruptcy the rights of a judicial lien creditor as of the date of the
filing of a petition.4 3  Pursuant to section 85(h), the petitioner would
have the same status. That status is a hypothetical one and arises only
as of the date of the filing of the petition commencing the case. What
those rights are with respect to a particular transfer would normally be
determined by applicable state law. For example, assume a pre-peti-
tion transfer which could be perfected against judicial lien cred-
itors under state law only if some act (e.g., recordation) were
done. If that act had not been performed by the date of the filing
of the petition, section 85(h) would allow the petitioner, succeeding
to the rights of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor on that date, to avoid
the transfer.
Whether any of these avoiding powers will have real utility in a
Chapter IX case commenced by a municipality remains to be seen. It
is difficult to perceive, for example, how the petitioner could have
made a conveyance that would have been fraudulent under section
67d. Voidable preferences may conceivably have occurred, although
it is relatively unlikely." Section 70c, in the normal case involving
private debtors, applies mostly to unperfected security interests. Those
transfers normally do not arise in the case of a municipality; it is there-
fore not likely that section 70c will be utilized to any great extent. It
was felt, however, that for purposes of granting a broad range of
powers it was more desirable to include the avoiding powers than to
leave them out.45
42. "Claim" is defined in section 81(1) to include all claims of whatever character,
secured or unsecured, including unliquidated and contingent claims. Section 63, which
defines "provable claims" for ordinary bankruptcy cases, is expressly made inapplicable
by section 81(1).
43. Under section 70c, the trustee is also given the rights of a hypothetical judgment
creditor and of a judgment creditor with execution returned unsatisfied. Normally, a
judicial lien encompasses the other two categories and gives greater rights to the creditor.
44. Normally, transfers by public employees with actual intent to defraud creditors
or with presumed intent (i.e., for less than a fair consideration when the municipality
is insolvent) would not occur. Preferential transfers to creditors could occur by or-
dinary payments to supply creditors, but it would be unlikely that petitioner would move
in a proceeding to recover such payments. Its main purpose is to negotiate a plan; such
payments, even if recovered, would not contribute to any significant extent to the fund-
ing necessary for the plan. In a financial crisis, note or bond payments would probably
be in default, and no payments would be made thereon shortly before the filing of a
petition.
45. The incorporation of the avoiding powers was included in the Senate bill but
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Thus, considering all of the provisions in subsections 85(e)
through (h), it can be seen that the court and the petitioner are given
a wide range of powers to deal with the property of the petitioner and
any pre-petition transfers.
(3) Rehabilitative provisions. In addition to the powers
mentioned above, Chapter IX now includes two provisions taken from
other rehabilitative chapters of the Act. These provisions, listed in
section 82, serve the general purpose of making rehabilitation more
feasible. Subsection 82(b) provides in its first paragraph for the re-
jection of executory contracts. Such a provision is not new to the
Bankruptcy Act; similar measures appear in Chapters X, XI and XII.
41
After hearing on notice to the parties to the contracts or leases, a
petitioner may be permitted by the court to reject burdensome executory
contracts and unexpired leases. Despite the precedent for its use in
other parts of the Act, this provision may prove controversial in the
Chapter IX context.
In the case of a large municipality, for example, labor contracts
with public employees may be burdensome, and in fact a partial cause
of the financial distress of the municipality. Although the law is not
very settled, there have been decisions involving private corporate
debtors, particularly in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
that permitted the rejection of collective bargaining agreements in
Chapter XI cases. Should any similar attempt be made in a Chapter
IX case involving a large municipality, it is quite likely that comparable
litigation would arise, but with somewhat different implications. Labor
contracts with public employees would generally be governed by state
legislation. As mentioned earlier,48 one of the characteristics dis-
tinguishing Chapter IX from the other chapters in the Bankruptcy Act
is its relationship to the constitutional balance between federal and
state powers. This relationship is recognized in Chapter IX of the Act
by section 83, which states:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to limit or impair
the power of any State to control, by legislation or otherwise, any
municipality or any political subdivision of or in such State in the
not in the House bill. The Senate version was accepted in conference with a few modifi-
cations. See CONF. REP. 19.
46. See sections 116(1) (Chapter X), 313(1) (Chapter XI), 413(1) (Chapter
XI).
47. See Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. R.E.A. Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975); Shopmen's Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., Inc., 519
F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
48. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
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exercise of its political or governmental powers, including expendi-
tures therefor.40
In the case of a labor contract, state law may provide that at the
expiration or termination for any reason of that contract, the existing
terms and conditions of employment shall continue in effect until a new
contract is negotiated. If a labor contract is rejected pursuant to
section 82(b) (1), questions can arise whether the terms and
conditions of the rejected contract continue in effect until a new one
is negotiated-questions which involve both the interpretation of state
law and the consideration of Congress' authority to affect that law. The
rejection of such a contract would normally not be for the purpose
of terminating employment but rather for the purpose of seeking differ-
ent terms and conditions of employment. One might, therefore,
expect litigation over whether the labor contract is one that may be
rejected and, if it may be rejected, whether the petitioner, with the
approval of the court, could unilaterally impose terms and conditions
of employment until a new one is negotiated.5° Of course, labor con-
tracts are not the only ones which may be rejected under section 82(b)
(1). Other contracts, such as leases or supply contracts, may be
equally burdensome, but it is unlikely that these would involve the
same problems as a labor contract. It should be recognized that an
49. Section 83.
50. A difference of opinion developed within the House Committee on this point.
In the majority report it is stated that renegotiation of a rejected contract would have
to be in accord with "applicable Federal, State, or municipal law" pursuant to section
83. H.R. REP. 8. "That section does not permit Chapter IX to interfere with or dero-
gate from any State law that regulates the way in which municipalities may execute this
governmental function." Id. at 9.
In the Supplemental Views, certain Republican Congressmen expressed disagree-
ment with this interpretation in the following language:
The Committee report indicates that even though executory collective bargain-
ing agreements may be rejected, certain collective bargaining agreement [sic]
may have to be renegotiated pursuant to State law and existing terms and condi-
tions of employment would have to be maintained subsequent to rejection be-
cause of certain provisions of State law.
Nothing could be further from the truth. No evidence was taken or
memoranda of law submitted to the Committee for discussion on that point.
No discussion of this matter took place in the Subcommittee or the full Com-
mittee. Id. at 57-58.
The view of the minority members then focused on section 83 and pointed out that it
was copied from the superseded chapter. The Supplemental Views continue: "It is
being retained because of the Committee's reluctance to remove tested language from
existing law and has no relevance to the power of the court to permit a petitioning mu-
nicipality to reject an executory contract." Id. at 58-59.
In the Senate's consideration of the Conference Report, the colloquy on the floor
indicates that the Senate agreed with the opinion expressed in the Supplemental View.
See 122 CoNo. REc. S4377 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1976). See also Note, Executory Labor
Contracts and Municipal Bankruptcy, 85 YALE L.J. 957, 966-69 (1976).
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"executory" contract is not defined in the Act.5 '
Subsection 82(b) also provides, in paragraph (2), for the issu-
ance of certificates of indebtedness. This is another provision taken
from both Chapters X and XI of the Act, but more directly from
Chapter X.52 It is recognized that during the pendency of a Chapter
IX case, and particularly toward the beginning of that case, the
petitioner may require financing in order to maintain its normal oper-
ations. The earlier version of Chapter IX supplanted by the 1976
amendment did not contain any provision with respect to obtaining such
financing through the issuance of certificates of indebtedness. Now,
a certificate may be issued with permission of the court "upon such
terms and conditions, and with such security and priority in payment
over existing obligations, secured or unsecured, and over costs and ex-
penses of administration," as the court may allow.5" The only priority
which is not permitted is over the payment of operating expenses of
the petitioner.54 If priority is to be given over a secured creditor, or
if the certificate is to be secured by a lien which would come ahead
of an existing lien, then notice to that secured creditor must be given
and a hearing must be held.55
As mentioned earlier, the basic purpose of this provision is to
create some possibility for the petitioner to obtain financing. Whether
the possibility will exist in a given case depends, of course, on the
willingness of banks or other types of lending institutions to provide
such financing against a certificate of indebtedness. No doubt with an
eye on the then-unfolding fiscal crisis in New York City, Congress gave
some thought during the drafting of this legislation to including in the
Act the requirement of a federal guarantee for any certificates that
might be issued during the pendency of a Chapter IX proceeding.5"
Naturally, such a guarantee would render any such certificate much
more marketable. It was probably recognized, however, that Chapter
IX was not being amended exclusively for the benefit of New York
City, but would also be applicable to water districts, sewage districts,
public agencies, and the like. It would not be desirable to require
51. A definition that may be useful in this regard posits that an executory contract
is one in which there is some performance left to be done on the part of both parties
to that contract. See Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy (pt. 1), 57
MINN. L. REv. 439, 460 (1973); id. (pt. 2), 58 MINN. L. Rv. 479 (1974).
52. See sections 116(2) (Chapter X), 344 (Chapter XI).
53. Section 82(b)(2).
54. Id.
55. See Rule 9-32.
56. See H.R. REP. 55-56 (separate views of Rep. Holtzman on H.R. 10,624).
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federal guarantees of certificates of indebtedness in all cases; more-
over, the political climate dictated the omission of such a provision.
The Filing Process
The claim filing procedure under Chapter IX is a simplified one
derived from the Chapter X Rules." Under the Act and Rules, 58 the
petitioner is required to file a list of creditors with their addresses and
the amounts of their claims. As unknown creditors become known,
the petitioner is required to file supplemental lists. A creditor whose
claim is listed by the petitioner need not file a proof of claim unless
the listed claim is designated as disputed, contingent or unliquidated
as to amount.5" If a claim is so listed, notice must be given to the
creditor of that fact, and of the time by which the creditor must file
a proof of claim. 0 The court may order that all proofs of claim be
filed and it may set a time for such filing.61  In the absence of any
objection to a proof of claim, that claim is deemed allowed.6 2
Approval of the Plan
The claim procedure is keyed into the vote necessary for the
acceptance of a plan proposed by the petitioner. Creditors with claims
that have been deemed allowed or that have in fact been allowed may
vote on a plan pursuant to section 92. Under section 92(b), a plan
must be accepted in writing by creditors holding at least two-thirds in
amount of claims of each class and more than 50% in number of
the claims of each class. The two-thirds and simple majorities re-
quired for confirmation are computed, under section 92(c), on the
basis of the votes which are in fact cast.6" This represents a departure
from the prior law. Previously, a creditor whose claim was filed and
allowed did not have to vote to reject a plan." A failure to vote
counted as a rejection. Under Chapter IX as amended, in order to
reject a plan a creditor must cast a ballot.
57. See Chapter X Rule 10-401.
58. See section 85(b); Rule 9-7. See note 15 supra.
59. Rule 9-22(a) (derived from section 88(a)).
60. Section 88(a); Rule 9-22(b)(3)(A).
61. See section 88(a); Rule 9-22(b)(1).
62. Section 88(a); Rule 9-22(e).
63. See also Rule 9-25(c). One who does not vote at all is not counted in any re-
spect. This method of computing the requisite majorities was derived from Chapter X
Rule 10-305(e).
64. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 403(d) (1970), with section 92(e).
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The petitioner may file a plan along with -its petition or at such later
time as the court fixes. 5 When the plan is filed, it is to be transmitted
to creditors together with notice of the period within which the plan
may be accepted or rejected. The plan may be accepted or rejected
prior to the conclusion of the meeting of creditors. 6 A summary of
the plan may be transmitted to creditors in substitution of the full plan
itself, but if a creditor requests a copy of the plan he is entitled to
receive it.67
The plan may include provisions modifying or altering the rights
of secured or unsecured creditors or any class of them. 6 Objections
may be filed to the plan by any party in interest, and by the Securities
and Exchange Commission. 9 After the expiration of the time set for
acceptance or rejection of the plan the court is to hold a hearing on
confirmation; notice of the hearing and of the time allowed for filing
objections is to be given all parties entitled to object.70
If a proposed plan has been properly accepted, the court must
make independent findings for final confirmation of that plan. The
court must find, for example, that the plan is fair, equitable and feasi-
ble, that it complies with the provisions of Chapter IX, that it has been
properly accepted, and that the petitioner is not prohibited by law from
taking any action necessary to be taken in order to carry out the pro-
visions of the plan.7'
The fair and equitable and feasible test is perhaps the most im-
portant of all of the conditions for confirmation. "Fair and equitable"
is taken from the superseded Chapter and is also found in Chapter X
of the Act.72  As construed in Chapter X it incorporates the absolute
priority rule.73 This normally means that distribution under the plan
must be made in accordance with the priority rights of creditors and
that no subordinate class may receive anything unless prior classes have
received in full that to which they are entitled. In the Chapter X
context, this application of the fair and equitable test normally requires
valuation of the business on a going concern basis in order to determine
65. See Rule 9-24(a) (derived from section 90(a)).
66. Rule 9-25(a). The meeting of creditors, of course, may be adjourned from time
to time. See Rule 9-24(b).
67. Rule 9-24(b).
68. See section 91.
69. See section 93. The SEC is, however, denied the right to appeal.
70. See section 94(a); Rule 9-27.
71. Section 94(b).
72. See section 221(2).
73. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); Northern Pacific
Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
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whether the corporation is insolvent. If it is insolvent, stockholders,
for example, are not entitled to receive anything under the plan be-
cause they are the lowest category or class of persons in the priority
list, and may not receive anything until all creditors have been paid
in full.
In a case involving a municipality under Chapter IX, the test
would have to be somewhat different. The municipality cannot be
valued on a going concern basis because it is not a profit-making enter-
prise. The fair and equitable and feasible test should more properly
involve a comparison between the expenditures and the income neces-
sary for the particular municipality, considering in the assessment of
income the extent to which taxes can be raised and obtained. 74 Feasi-
bility would be determined by ascertaining whether the petitioner is
presently, or in the future will be, in a position to carry out the specific
provisions of that plan.
The amended chapter also provides for certain priorities which
were not included in the previous chapter.75  It lists three classes of
priorities:
(1) the costs and expenses of administration;
(2) debts owed for services or materials provided within three
months before the filing of the petition; and
(3) debts owing to any person which are entitled to priority by
the laws of the United States other than the Bankruptcy Act.
The only creditor which would be entitled to a priority under the
laws of the United States would be the United States government
itself.76 Under section 89, provision for full payment of priority debts
must be made in the plan, unless a waiver is executed by the claimant.
Dismissal of Case
Unfortunately, section 98(b) provides that if confirmation is
refused the court must dismiss the case. Such dismissal would take
the petitioner out of the supervision of the court and probably put it
back in the same position it was in before it filed the petition. To
obviate this result, a court should to the extent possible refrain from
refusing confirmation but rather should put off a decision on the confir-
mation issue and permit the filing of a modified plan in the hope that
such a plan could be confirmed.
74. See H.R. REP. 32-33.
75. See section 89.
76. 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970).
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As distinguished from dismissing a petition pursuant to an answer
filed opposing it,77 section 98(a) provides other reasons for dismissal
of the case. Under this section, the case may be dismissed for want
of prosecution (1) if a plan is not proposed within the time fixed or
extended, (2) if a proposed plan is not accepted within the time fixed
or extended, or (3) if the petitioner defaults in any of the terms of
the plan or pursuant to the occurrence of a condition specified in the
plan. As indicated above, if the court cannot confirm the plan, dis-
missal is mandatory. Dismissal for these other reasons lies within the
discretion of the court.
Finally, section 95(b) provides for the discharge of all claims
against the petitioner when a plan has been confirmed and when
the necessary deposit has been made. Claims which are not dis-
charged include those specifically excepted from discharge by the plan
or confirmation order and those claims held by persons lacking timely
notice or actual knowledge of the petition or the plan.
Conclusion
As may be seen from this survey of the provisions of Chapter IX
as amended and the Rules for Chapter IX, the present statute and rules
conform more closely to other rehabilitation chapters under the
Bankruptcy Act than did the earlier version of Chapter IX. It is
certainly contemplated that such conformity will make its use more
practical and will assist in the rehabilitation process when a petition is
filed by an eligible entity. The amended version was drafted and
enacted in a relatively short period of time. While it reflects a very
thoughtful and competent undertaking, it is quite possible that some
errors may have crept in which will come to light as the statute is used.
Naturally, it is the hope of all concerned that it will not have to be
used, particularly by any municipality, large or small.
77. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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